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Abstract
We present a novel theoretical mechanism that explains the capacity for non-enforceable
communication about future actions to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player part-
nership game where, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, each player
makes a cheap talk promise to their partner about their own future effort. We allow agents
to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong ten-
dency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur intermediate costs of reneging,
and show that these intermediate costs induce second-best optimal outcomes.
Keywords: Promises, lying costs, joint projects, input games, partnerships.
JEL Classification: C73, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
Communication about future actions in joint projects is pervasive in the household, within and
between firms, in political processes, and in casual day-to-day interactions. Often, agents can
make statements about their intentions, both as a means of coordination and as a promise.
Frequently, they are not contractually bound by these statements and have an incentive to make
false promises and renege upon them when choosing how to act. Nevertheless, agents in such
circumstances commonly use communication to carry out courses of action that yield a higher
payoff to each than would be expected if agents could make and break promises at no direct cost
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(cheap talk). Consider, for example, two coauthors initiating a project and making promises
about the number of hours they will separately work on it in the following year, or countries
making commitments to reduce regional levels of pollution.
Our two key contributions are as follows. First, we present a novel theoretical foundation of
the prevalence of intermediate psychological costs of breaking promises (reneging). Second, we
demonstrate that these endogenously determined intermediate psychological costs yield second-
best optimal outcomes in an important class of strategic interactions. Taken together, these
contributions present a novel explanation for the way in which pre-play communication can
foster cooperation in one-shot strategic interactions when agents’ interests are only partially
aligned.
Much of the existing literature on signaling intentions through cheap talk explores the po-
tential for pre-play communication to select among multiple equilibria by breaking symmetries,
offering assurance, and creating a focal point for play (for a theoretical discussion, see Farrell,
1988; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; for experimental evidence see Crawford, 1998; Charness, 2000).
However, extensive experimental evidence shows that communication can also lead players to
coordinate on mutually beneficial but non-equilibrium outcomes (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland,
1994; Sally, 1995; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2011). In particular,
Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) find that players make and keep promises to cooperate in two-
player partnership games where the unique subgame perfect equilibrium involves no such coop-
eration. Vanberg (2008) presents evidence that this behaviour is driven by an aversion to going
back on one’s word.
The possibility of repeated interaction with a partner means that reputational concerns
could motivate agents to keep their promises, even when this does not maximise their payoff
in the present encounter. However, the aforementioned experiments, and indeed much of daily
experience, demonstrate that agents are motivated to some extent to keep their word even in
one-off encounters and suggests a direct concern for keeping promises. In this paper, we put
reputational concerns to one side and consider this second, direct motivation for promise-keeping.
Model and Main Results
We study a class of partnership games (also known as input games; see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1982;
Cooper & John, 1988) with cheap talk pre-play communication. In the setting we examine,
agents simultaneously communicate promised levels of effort, and, following this, they simulta-
neously choose their levels of effort. Agents experience a direct convex cost of their effort, and
a benefit which is increasing in both their own effort and that of their partner, such that effort
choices are strategic complements. Agents always have an incentive to slightly “undercut” (exert
less effort than) their partner so that when talk is cheap, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of
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the game involves both agents choosing zero effort. However, this outcome is Pareto-dominated
by outcomes in which players exert effort.
We explore the impact of introducing into this setting a direct convex cost of reneging on
promises. Specifically, we assume that each agent experiences a convex psychological cost of
the distance between their promised and actual effort. This aversion to reneging can be seen as
representing the guilt or bad feeling that agents experience when going back on promises they
have made. Reneging aversion transforms what is ordinarily modeled as a cheap talk promise
into a partially self-enforcing commitment. We show that positive effort can be sustained in
equilibrium either when one player has a high level of reneging aversion and her partner a low
level of reneging aversion, or when both have an intermediate level of reneging aversion. In
the asymmetric case, the player with the high level of reneging aversion effectively plays like
a Stackelberg leader, and the partner effectively responds like a Stackelberg follower. In the
symmetric case in which both players have an intermediate level of reneging aversion, both
players promise to exert maximal effort in the first stage, and then shirk slightly by under-
delivering in the second stage.
A novel insight of the model is to show that two players with high levels of aversion to
reneging on promises may fail to maintain positive effort in equilibrium. The intuition for this
result is that a high level of reneging aversion renders a promise to make a positive effort credible,
which in turn implies an incentive for each player to slightly undercut her partner when making
promises in the first stage, which in turn makes a player unwilling to promise a positive level of
effort in the first place. By contrast, players with intermediate levels of reneging aversion sustain
positive effort as each is sufficiently committed to her promise that her partner can reciprocate
a promise of high effort without fear of being severely undercut in the second stage; but, at the
same time, each partner knows that if she tries to “shirk” and promise low effort, her partner
has sufficient flexibility to respond with a lower choice of effort in the second stage, making this
“shirking” unprofitable.
We then study the endogenous determination of this reneging aversion in an evolutionary
framework. Our main result demonstrates the strong tendency for evolutionary processes to
select for agents who incur intermediate psychological reneging costs. Specifically, we show that
when players can observe their partner’s level of reneging aversion with a sufficiently high prob-
ability, there is a unique stable population state in which all players have the same intermediate
level of reneging aversion, and the induced equilibrium effort is a second-best outcome (i.e., it is
optimal under the constraint of being consistent with equilibrium behaviour). Finally, we show
that a weaker version of this result holds also when players can observe their partner’s level of
reneging aversion with a low, yet positive, probability. In this latter case, we show that in any
stable state players must have positive reneging aversion and exert positive effort in equilibrium.
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Related Literature and Contributions
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. The first is the theoretical work incorpo-
rating exogenously given (and, typically, small) psychological lying costs into strategic models.
Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) study sender-receiver games in which the informed agent
has an incentive to distort the receiver’s belief, and incurs a convex cost of sending a false mes-
sage. Matsushima (2008) and Kartik et al. (2014) introduce arbitrarily small lying costs into
settings of mechanism design and implementation. The present paper moves beyond the exist-
ing literature in three key dimensions. Firstly, we explore bilateral communication. Secondly,
we interpret players’ messages as a report about their own future actions rather than some ex-
ogenously given state of the world. These two aspects add further strategic dimensions to the
partnership game. Thirdly, we endogenise the reneging costs, and allow them to be determined
as part of a stable population state.1
With this focus on commitment to future action, we bring together the literature on lying
costs and that on partnership games with strategic complimentarities. Games in which n players
experience a common outcome, which is increasing in a privately costly action, are examined
from a mechanism design perspective in Holmstrom (1982). Radner et al. (1986) analyse a two-
player partnership game in which a project succeeds with a probability equal to the minimum of
the players’ effort choices, which are made at quadratic cost, and show the capacity for repeated
interaction to sustain effort when such an outcome is efficient but is not an equilibrium of the
one-shot game (see also related models of partnership games in Cooper & John, 1988; Admati
& Perry, 1991; Cahuc & Kempf, 1997; Marx & Matthews, 2000). We demonstrate that reneging
costs is a new means by which cooperation can be sustained in partnerships in one-off encounters
with non-enforceable effort choices.
The role of commitment in strategic situations has been extensively investigated since the
seminal work of Schelling (1980) (see, e.g., Caruana & Einav, 2008; Ellingsen & Miettinen, 2008;
Heller & Winter (2016); and the references in them for recent papers in this vast literature).
One of the main stylised insights of this literature is that the ability to commit is advantageous
to a player and that, typically, a better ability to commit yields higher payoffs. Our model yields
the insight that too great a capacity for commitment (i.e., too high a level of reneging aversion)
might be detrimental. Specifically, we show that there is an intermediate level of commitment
that is optimal for an agent, as it balances their interest in making a strong commitment in order
to induce high effort from their partner, against their conflicting desire to retain some flexibility
1Demichelis & Weibull (2008) study the influence of the introduction of lexicographic reneging costs into a
setup in which players communicate before playing a coordination game. They show that the introduction of
these lying costs implies that the unique evolutionarily stable outcome is Pareto efficient. Heller (2014) shows
that this sharp equilibrium selection result is implied by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small
lying costs per se.
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to exert less effort.
We explore not only the consequences of an aversion to reneging but also give a theoretical
exploration of its possible evolutionary determinants. In doing so, we build on the “indirect”
evolutionary approach, which studies the evolution of non-material preferences, that was pio-
neered by Güth & Yaari (1992), and developed by, among others, Ok & Vega-Redondo, 2001;
Guttman, 2003; Dekel et al., 2007; Herold & Kuzmics, 2009; Alger & Weibull, 2010, 2012. We
make two main contributions to this literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to apply the indirect evolutionary approach to study reneging costs. Second, our main result
is qualitatively different from the stylised result in the existing literature, according to which
if preferences are observed with high probability, then the Pareto efficient outcome is played in
any stable population state. We show that in the setup in which the set of feasible preferences is
the set of levels of reneging aversion, evolutionary forces take the population into stable states
in which agents have intermediate reneging aversion and the agents achieve partial, rather than
full, efficiency.
Heifetz et al. (2007b) study payoff-monotonic selection dynamics in normal-form games in
which the set of strategies of each player is an open subset of Rn and preference “distortions” (di-
vergences between the subjective utility function and the material payoff function) are perfectly
observable. They show that in almost every such game and for almost every family of distortions
of a player’s actual payoffs, some degree of distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not
be driven out by any evolutionary process in the sense that there will not be a convergence
to a population in which everyone has zero distortion. Heifetz et al. (2007a) make additional
assumptions: (1) the set of actions of each player is an interval in R, (2) the underlying game
has a unique pure equilibrium for each pair of distortions, and (3) the type game is dominance
solvable. Under these assumptions the authors show that the selection dynamics converge to
every player having the same distorted type, and that this result can be extended to a setup
with partial observability. The game studied in this paper does not satisfy these additional as-
sumptions (in particular, the set of strategies of the normal-form game is infinite-dimensional).
Nevertheless, we are able to show results that are consistent with the results of Heifetz et al.
(2007a) and, in addition, to explicitly characterize the unique stable level of reneging aversion.
Finally, by demonstrating the significance and evolutionary stability of an aversion to reneg-
ing in partnership contexts, we provide a theoretical grounding and explanation of the mass
of experimental evidence suggesting that “non-standard” preferences play an important role in
communication contexts, and that most people incur some psychological costs of lying, and that
these costs are increasing in the size of the lie (see Abeler et al., 2016, for a recent meta-study
of a large number of lying experiments). For example, Shalvi et al. (2011) and Fischbacher &
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) find that subjects do not always lie to gain money, even when their doing so
cannot be detected. Significantly less than “full” lying is also found in sender-receiver contexts
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(Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens & Kartik, 2009), bargaining games (Lundquist et al., 2009), and hold-up
games (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004), with some studies finding evidence of lying aversion per
se (Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the partnership game and analyses its
equilibria. Section 3 formally defines the evolutionary model and presents our main result about
the stability of intermediate levels of reneging aversion. Section 4 demonstrates the robustness
of this result to partial observability. In Section 5 we discuss the significance and interpretation
of our results and indicate directions for further research. In general, we confine formal proofs
to appendices, with exceptions where the proof is brief and aids intuition.
2 The Partnership Game
In this section, we formally describe the partnership game and analyse the subgame perfect
equilibria of encounters between any two players with weakly positive aversion to reneging on
promises.
2.1 The Model
There are two players (i and j) and two stages of the game. In the first stage, both players
simultaneously send a message sk ∈ [0, 1] ≡ S to their opponent (where k = i, j). The interpre-
tation is that players’ messages take the form of a promise about effort in the second stage. In
the second stage, players simultaneously choose their level of effort, xk ∈ S.
Remark 1. For simplicity, we define the maximum message (and level of effort) to be one. All
of our results remain qualitatively the same, for any other upper limit M > 0 to the set of
messages.
For a given outcome of the game, we define the “material payoff” to player i as follows (player
j’s material payoff is defined analogously):
Vi(xi, xj, c) = xixj − cx
2
i
2 : c > 1 (1)
The interpretation of the material payoff is as follows. Both players receive the same gross
return from the partnership, equal to the product of their two effort choices. They each incur a
cost proportional to the square of their own effort. The parameter c governs the cost of effort.
We focus in our evolutionary analysis on low values of c in the interval of (1, 1.24), as these prove
most illuminating.
Player i’s subjective utility is defined as follows (player j’s subjective utility is defined anal-
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ogously):
Ui(xi, xj, si, c) = xixj − cx
2
i
2 −
λi
2 (si − xi)
2 : c > 1 (2)
Subjective utility is the sum of a player’s material payoff and a term representing the psy-
chological cost of breaking a promise (reneging). Here, reneging is defined as exerting a level of
effort not equal to the message sent (i.e., the effort promised) in the first stage. The “size” of
player i’s reneging is defined as |si − xi|. The utility loss from reneging is proportional to the
square of its size, multiplied by λi, a parameter that we call i’s level of reneging aversion. In
the following two sections we assume that all players perfectly observe their partner’s level of
reneging aversion, i.e., that the parameters λi, λj are common knowledge. In Section 4 we deal
with the case of partial observability.
A mixed strategy of player i in the second stage is a distribution χi ∈ ∆ (S). Let µχi denote
the expectation of the distribution. We assume that players are expected utility maximisers.
The fact that the utility function Ui depends linearly on the effort of the opponent (xj) implies
that player i’s expected utility depends only on the expected effort of the partner (µχj), which
replaces xj in Eq. (2) to yield an expected utility function, i.e.,
Ui(xi, χj, si, c) = xi · µχj −
cx2i
2 −
λi
2 (si − xi)
2 : c > 1 (3)
2.2 Unique Second-Stage Equilibrium
In the second stage of the game, player i’s first-order condition for her choice of xi is given by2
µχj − cxi + λi(si − xi) = 0 (4)
The concavity of the utility function in xi implies that the second-stage best response is a unique
pure strategy, given by the function
x∗i (χj, si, sj, λi, λj, c) =
µχj + λisi
c+ λi
(5)
This equation embodies a player’s (possibly conflicting) desires to undercut (exert less effort
than) their opponent and to minimise their reneging.
Fact 1. We first observe that when λi = λj = 0 (i.e., both players’ messages are cheap talk) the
best response of player i reduces to µχj
c
. This implies that when talk is cheap, both players wish
to undercut their opponent in the second stage, effort choices are independent of messages sent,
2The second derivative of the utility function with respect to xi is −c−λi. The fact that it is always negative
guarantees that the solution to the first-order condition is a global maximum of the utility function and that the
optimal choice in the second stage is a unique pure strategy.
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and in all subgame perfect equilibria, neither player exerts effort and communication plays no
committing role.
To consider the general case of positive reneging costs, we solve the best-response functions
simultaneously and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy for player i in the subgame
induced by an arbitrary pair of messages si and sj:
xei (si, sj, λi, λj, c) =
(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1 (6)
To gain some intuition, we can consider the subgame after si = sj = s is played. In this
case, xi < xj ⇐⇒ λi < λj. Both players have an incentive to undercut one another (and by
implication renege on their own first-stage promises), but they also do not want to incur too
great a cost from reneging. Due to the convex cost of reneging and the diminishing material
gains from reducing effort towards xj
c
, the optimal choice of xi balances these two aims. In the
general case where si 6= sj, the Nash equilibrium choice of xi is some convex combination of
si, sj,34 and 0. As a player’s level of reneging aversion increases, she will exert effort closer to
her own promise.
2.3 First-Stage Best-Response Functions
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is easily obtained using backwards induction.
Given the unique Nash equilibrium strategies in each subgame, we can find a player’s optimal
choice of message given her opponent’s choice. Taking the choices of effort in each subgame as
given, a player i’s utility as a function of first-stage messages is given by
Ui(si, sj, c) =
[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj][(c+ λi)λjsj + λisi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
− c[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − (c+ λj)λisi + λjsj(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1
]2 (7)
A mixed strategy of a player at the first stage is a distribution σi ∈ ∆ (S). Let µσi denote
the expectation of the distribution. Observe that the utility function Ui can be presented as a
sum of two functions: (1) a linear function of sj and (2) an expression that is independent of
si. This implies that the best-reply function of player i against a partner who plays a mixed
strategy σj depends only on the partner’s expected message µσj (for reasons analogous to those
in the argument for µχjabove).
3To see this, observe that the denominator of the fraction is strictly positive and strictly greater than the sum
of the coefficients on si and s−i in the numerator.
4This guarantees that xei , xej ∈ [0, 1) and therefore the first-order condition always characterises optimal choice.
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When λi = 0, player i’s choice of message has no bearing on her optimal effort choice or
that of her opponent, and therefore does not impact her utility. Therefore any message is a best
response to any message sent by her opponent. When λi > 0, the first derivative of player i’s
utility function with respect to si, taking µσj as given, is a linear function of si and µσj :
∂Ui(si, µσj , c)
∂si
=
[
2− c(c+ λj)− 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
]
si + λj · µσj (8)
For ease of exposition, we define Θi to be the negative of the coefficient on si in Eq. (8):
c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 ≡ Θi
Given that λj and µσj are constrained to be (weakly) positive, the second term in Eq. (8) is
also (weakly) positive. Therefore, when Θi > 0 (and hence the term multiplying si in Eq. (8)
is strictly negative), the utility function is everywhere strictly concave in si, and the following
level of si, which is positive and satisfies the first-order condition
∂Ui(si,µσj ,c)
∂si
= 0, is a necessary
and sufficient condition for a global maximum of the utility function:
si(µσj , λi, λj, c) =
λj
Θi
· µσj (9)
Further, the strict concavity of the utility function in si means that when
λj
Θi
· µσj > 1, the
optimal choice of si is 1.
When Θi < 0 (and hence the term in si in Eq. (8) is strictly positive), the utility function
is everywhere strictly increasing and convex in si. In this case, the optimal choice of si is 1, for
all µσj ∈ S. When Θi = 0, if λj > 0 and µσj > 0, then again the utility function is everywhere
strictly increasing and convex in si and the optimal choice of si is 1. If Θi = 0 and either
λj = 0 or µσj = 0, then the utility function is flat in si and any message is a best response to
the opponent’s message. The best-response correspondence in the first stage can therefore be
written as
s∗i (µσj , λi, λj, c) =

λj
Θi
· µσj 0 ≤
λj
Θi
sj ≤ 1 and Θi > 0
1 λjΘi
sj > 1 or Θi < 0 or (Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0)
[0, 1] Θi = 0 and λj · µσj = 0
(10)
The choice of the best reply in the latter “knife-edge” case, in which Θi = λj · µσj = 0
does not play any role in our results. In all other cases, the unique best-reply function of both
players always induces them to choose a pure message and, as a result, both players choose pure
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messages in all equilibria.
Remark 2. Observe that a player can always guarantee a utility level of zero by playing si =
xi = 0. Further, observe that if Θi > 0 (Θi < 0 or [Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0]), then the utility
function is strictly concave (strictly increasing) in si. This implies that if the best response s∗i
is positive (i.e., s∗i > 0) and unique, then it must yield strictly positive utility for player i.
Players wish to minimise their reneging, undercut their opponent (play close to xj
c
), and have
their opponent put in as much effort as possible. Their optimal choice will therefore balance these
three aims. It is straightforward to see that if a player’s choice of message has no impact upon
her opponent’s choice of effort, she will promise, and deliver, effort that undercuts her opponent.
However, while a player knows that she in some sense “ties her hands” if she promises to put
in higher effort in the presence of a reneging cost, and restricts her ability to undercut in the
second stage, such a promise has a second, strategic effect: because the player’s opponent knows
that he will not be severely undercut, he is willing to put in more effort in the second stage.
This strategic effect is a consequence of the strategic complementarity of effort with respect to
the material payoffs.
In a set of games with measure zero, all of these considerations cancel out such that any
message is a best response.5 Otherwise, a player’s best response to her opponent’s message
can be classified as one of three kinds. When the incentive to undercut dominates, a player
wants to send a message that is some fraction (less than 1) of her opponent’s message. When
the incentive to strategically commit to high effort dominates, a player wants either to send
a message that is some multiple (greater than 1) of her opponent’s message or to send the
maximum possible message in all cases. Whether a player optimally chooses to undercut her
opponent or to strategically commit to high effort depends only on the level of c and the players’
reneging costs and is invariant to the commitment made by her opponent.
The division of the parameter space into these best-response types is illustrated in Figure
1. The higher a player’s reneging aversion is, the more able she is to make a credible, strategic
commitment. Such a strategic commitment is more worthwhile when facing a lower cost of effort
(lower c) and a player with a lower reneging aversion (who is consequently more responsive
to commitments made). Therefore a player will strategically promise high effort when λi is
sufficiently high and λj and c sufficiently low. Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix C.1 constitute
a full set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a player’s best response to be of each type.
2.4 Unique Perfect Equilibrium
We now present the subgame perfect equilibria of the partnership game. All subgame perfect
equilibria of the partnership game can be classified as one of three types, set out below. In some
5This is the set of cases covered by the third row of the best-response correspondence; see Eq. (10).
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Figure 1: Best-Response Types for Player i in Reneging Aversion Parameter Space
(a) c = 1.24 (b) c = 1.2
(c) c = 1.1 (d) c = 1.05
(Note that the upper figures focus on the interval λiλj ∈ [0, 4], while the lower figures
show the wider interval λiλj ∈ [0, 20].)
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parameterisations of the game, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique. In the remaining
set of cases, the game admits two subgame perfect equilibria but one is not a “trembling-hand”
perfect equilibrium (see the formal definition in Appendix A), and, thus, we do not consider
it as a plausible prediction of play. The unique equilibrium that satisfies the trembling-hand
perfection refinement can be classified as one of three types, and its classification depends only
on a single pair of parameters (one for each player). For each player i, we define the variable Ri
as follows:
Ri ≡

λj
Θi
Θi > 0
∞ Θi ≤ 0
Rj is defined analogously. Each partnership game maps to a pair (Ri, Rj) that corresponds
to one type of unique perfect equilibrium with first-stage play as follows:
1. min (Ri, Rj) > 1 ⇔si = sj = 1: “Maximum message” equilibrium. This equilibrium arises
when both players wish either to send a higher message than their opponent or to send
the maximum possible message.
2. Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj ⇔si = 1 > sj > 0: “Two-message” equilibrium. This equilibrium arises
when one player wishes to send a message lower than that of her opponent (undercut) and
her opponent wishes to strategically induce higher effort in her. When the player trying
to induce higher effort wants to do so more than his opponent wishes to undercut, then a
perfect equilibrium exists in which the former sends the maximum message and the latter
best responds to it.
3. Ri · Rj < 1 ⇔sj = si = 0: “No-effort” equilibrium. This is the case in which either
(1) both players wish to undercut their opponent or (2) one player wants to undercut his
opponent to a greater extent than the opponent wishes to send a higher message than that
of the player. This implies that the only subgame perfect equilibrium involves both players
promising, and exerting, no effort.
In each of these cases we specify only the messages si, sj, as, given the players’ messages, their
effort choices are uniquely determined by Eq. (6) in all cases except the “knife-edge” case of
Θi = λj = 0, discussed below. Formally, we present the unique perfect equilibria that exist in
three exhaustive classes of games (the definition of trembling-hand perfection is presented in
Appendix A).
Theorem 1. Assume that λi, λj > 0.
1. If min (Ri, Rj) > 1, then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which si = sj = 1.
The set of pairs (λi, λj) for which min (Ri, Rj) > 1 is non-empty if and only if c < 1.25.
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Moreover, this set is symmetric, convex, and bounded away from the origin and from
infinity in the sense that for all c < 1.25 there exist λc, λ+c ∈ (0,∞) such that min (Ri, Rj) >
1 implies that λc ≤ max (λi, λj) ≤ λ+c .
2. If Ri·Rj > 1 > Rj, then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which si = 1 > sj > 0.
The set of pairs (λi, λj) for which Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj is non-empty if and only if c <
√
2.
3. If Ri · Rj < 1, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which sj = si = 0.
The set of pairs (λi, λj) for which Ri ·Rj < 1 is non-empty for all c > 1.
Moreover, in cases 1 and 2, the game admits at most one additional subgame perfect equilibrium
in which sj = si = 0, and this latter equilibrium fails to satisfy trembling-hand perfection.
Henceforth, we use the term the unique perfect equilibrium to refer to the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium that satisfies the trembling-hand perfection refinement when λi, λj > 0.
In the case where one player has a level of reneging aversion of zero, equilibria exist that
are analogous to the three types set out above. Rather than there being a unique perfect
equilibrium for each pair of reneging costs, there exists in each case a unique continuum of
essentially equivalent subgame perfect equilibria (that are trembling-hand perfect) that differ
only in the cheap talk message sent by the player with zero reneging aversion. Within each
continuum, effort levels (which are described by Eq. (6)), subjective utilities, and material
payoffs are the same in all equilibria. The formal characterisation of equilibria in the case where
one player has zero reneging aversion is given in Appendix B. Recall that the case in which
λi = λj = 0 is dealt with in Fact 1.
Multiple perfect equilibria occur only on a “measure zero” of pairs of λi, λj that satisfy the
equality Ri ·Rj = 1. Assume without loss of generality that Rj ≤ 1 ≤Ri. In such cases, for any
si ∈ [0, 1], there exists a perfect equilibrium in which the messages are
(
si, sj =
λi
Θj
· si
)
(the
argument is analogous to those in Theorem 1 above, and is omitted for brevity).
We formalise one corollary of Theorem 1, which says that if players reneging costs are identical
and positive, they send the same message in the unique perfect equilibrium.
Corollary 1. Let λi = λj > 0. Then the equality si = sj holds in the unique perfect equilibrium
of the partnership game
Proof. For λi, λj > 0, Theorem 1 shows that the only cases (those covered by point 2) where
si 6= sj are such that Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj. This implies that Ri 6= Rj. From the definition of Θi,
we see that λi = λj ⇒ Θi = Θj. From the definition of Ri, we see that λi = λj and Θi = Θj
together imply that Ri = Rj. Therefore λi = λj ⇒ Ri = Rj, which implies that si = sj.
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Figure 2 illustrates, for a range of values of c, the division of reneging aversion parameter
space into the three classes of unique equilibria. When both λi and λj are high or when both
are low, the unique equilibrium is a no-effort equilibrium. When one player has a high level of
reneging aversion and the other a low level, the unique equilibrium is a two-message equilibrium.
Finally, if both players’ levels of aversion to reneging are intermediate (and sufficiently similar)
then we have the maximum message equilibrium. Here, both players are sufficiently bound by
their message so that they will be able to strategically induce high effort in their partner, but are
also flexible enough to respond to their partner’s promise. A full set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of each type of unique equilibrium, in terms of the parameters of
the game, can be derived by combining the conditions presented in the Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 in
Appendix C.1.
3 Evolution of Observable Reneging Costs
In this section we endogenise reneging costs, and present a static model to study the evolution
of these costs in a setup in which both players observe their partner’s level of reneging aversion.
3.1 Population Game
We consider a large population of players (technically, a continuum) in which each player is
endowed with a level of reneging aversion. Players are uniformly randomly matched into pairs,
and both observe their partner’s reneging aversion before starting the two-stage partnership
game described above. We assume that in each such partnership game, the players play the
unique perfect equilibrium.
Given levels of reneging aversion λ, λ′ ∈ R+ with Ri · Rj 6= 1 and cost of effort c, let
Gc(λ, λ′) denote the partnership game where players with reneging aversion λ and λ
′ meet and
let pic (λ, λ′) denote the material payoff of the player with reneging aversion λ, given that they
play the unique perfect equilibrium of the partnership game (or any equilibrium in the unique
continuum of perfect equilibria when λi = 0 or λj = 0). To simplify notation, where this does
not lead to ambiguity, we omit the subscript c and write G(λ, λ′) and pi (λ, λ′).
Given symmetric levels of reneging aversion λ = λ′ ∈ R+ inducing Ri = Rj = 1 and hence
multiple perfect equilibria, we assume that the players play the most efficient equilibria, in which
they both send the maximum message, i.e., si = sj = 1, and we let pi (λ, λ) be the material
payoffs in these maximum message equilibria. Given levels of reneging aversion λ 6= λ′ ∈ R+
inducing Ri · Rj = 1 and multiple perfect equilibria, we can assume any arbitrary equilibrium
selection function (without affecting our results), and we let pi (λ, λ′) be the material payoff in
these arbitrarily selected equilibria.
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Figure 2: Unique Perfect Equilibrium Types in Reneging Aversion Parameter Space
(a) c = 1.24 (b) c = 1.2
(c) c = 1.1 (d) c = 1.05
(Note that the upper figures focus on the interval λiλj ∈ [0, 4], while the lower figures
show the wider interval λiλj ∈ [0, 20].)
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Remark 3. The assumption that the most efficient equilibrium is chosen in G (λ, λ) when Ri =
Rj = 1 is motivated as follows. In the model, the set of feasible levels of reneging aversion is
a continuum. We consider this to be an approximation for dynamic environments in which the
set of feasible levels of reneging aversion is discrete due to either: (1) a finite, albeit very large,
set of feasible genotypes in a biological evolutionary process, or (2) some constraints in social
evolutionary processes that imply that only a finite number of levels of reneging aversion may
be selected; for example, the reneging aversion could represent some rule of thumb that induces
a trade-off between keeping promises and making opportunistic gains, where the set of feasible
simple rules that agents may adopt is finite. With relatively simple adaptations to the arguments
in the main result below (Theorem 2), it can be shown that in such discrete environments, the
evolutionary forces will take the population into a homogeneous state in which all agents have
the highest level of reneging aversion, λ, that is below λ+c . In the game G (λ, λ), where players
have such a level of reneging aversion, Ri = Rj will be slightly above one, and the unique
perfect equilibrium will be a maximum message equilibrium. In the model, we wish to abstract
away from formally defining the discreteness of the set of feasible types, and thus in Theorem
2 we obtain convergence to λ+c , inducing Ri = Rj = 1 and multiple equilibria in the game
G (λ+c , λ+c ). We interpret the selection of the maximum message equilibrium as corresponding
to the equilibrium of a more elaborate discrete model in which the slightly lower level of λ is
chosen.
The payoff function pi : R+ × R+ → R defines a symmetric two-player population game
Γ = (R+, pi). A pure (mixed) strategy in this game corresponds to a level of reneging aversion
(a distribution over levels of reneging aversion).
It is well known that stable population states correspond to symmetric equilibria of the
population game, given a smooth and payoff-monotone dynamic process by which the levels of
reneging aversion evolve, such as the replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker, 1978; see Weibull,
1995; Sandholm, 2010 for a textbook introduction). Specifically:
1. Any symmetric strict equilibrium corresponds to a stable population state in which all the
incumbents have the same reneging aversion. Any agent who is endowed with a different
level of reneging aversion (due to random error or experimentation) is strictly outper-
formed, and is assumed to be eliminated from the population. The same holds for any
sufficiently small group of “mutant” agents who are endowed with a different level of reneg-
ing aversion. In particular, it is well known that any strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily
stable state a` la Maynard Smith & Price (1973).
2. Any stable population state must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Nachbar,
1990). Otherwise, there is a level of reneging aversion that allows a deviator to strictly out-
perform the incumbents; we assume that other agents will start to mimic such a successful
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deviator, and that the population will move away from the initial state.
Remark 4. As argued by Eshel (1983) and Oechssler & Riedel (2001), strict equilibrium might
not be a sufficient condition for dynamic stability in setups in which a small perturbation can
slightly change the reneging aversion of all agents in the population. In Section 5 we discuss the
notions of stability proposed by these authors, and explain why imposing these more restrictive
solution concepts does not affect our results.
3.2 Stability of Intermediate Reneging Aversion
The following result shows that when the cost of effort is sufficiently low (c is low), the pop-
ulation game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (λ+c , λ+c ), which is also a strict
equilibrium in which both players promise to exert maximal effort. Moreover, the equilibrium
(λ+c , λ+c ) induces the second-best outcome; i.e., it maximises the sum of material payoffs among
all pure strategy equilibria of the partnership game. Finally, λ+c is decreasing in c and converges
to ∞ as c converges to one, which implies that the equilibrium material payoffs converge in the
limit c→ 1 to the first-best outcome in which both players commit to, and exert, maximal effort.
Theorem 2. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24). Then, the population game admits a unique pure symmetric
Nash equilibrium (λ+c , λ+c ). Moreover, (1) the equilibrium (λ+c , λ+c ) is strict, (2) both players
promise to exert maximal effort in the partnership game G (λ+c , λ+c ), (3) pi (λ+c , λ+c ) > pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c , (4) λ+c and pi (λ+c , λ+c ) are decreasing in c, and (5) limc→1 λ+c = ∞, and
limc→1 pi (λ+c , λ+c ) = 12 , which is the first-best payoff.
Our main result implies that the evolutionary forces move the population into a unique stable
state in which all agents have the same intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c , they promise
to exert maximal effort, and all interactions yield the second-best outcome. This suggests a
strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select this intermediate level of reneging aversion
when players each observe their opponent’s type.
The stable level of reneging aversion λ+c is the highest level of reneging aversion that induces
a maximum message equilibrium when two players with this level of reneging aversion meet
and play the partnership game together. Intuitively, this level of reneging aversion is stable
because if any mutant with a lower level of reneging aversion were to enter the population,
while they would have greater flexibility to undercut a λ+c -type partner at the second stage of
any encounter, this type of partner would anticipate the undercutting and reduce his effort to
such a degree that the mutant would achieve a lower payoff than if she were a λ+c -type player.
Any alternative mutant with a higher level of reneging aversion would induce a no-effort or
two-message equilibrium when meeting the λ+c -type players, and so achieve a lower payoff. No
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other homogeneous population is stable because either all partnership interactions result in a
no-effort equilibrium and yield both players a payoff of zero – in which case there is always some
alternative type that could enter the population and achieve a positive payoff (this fact is proven
in Lemma 4) – or all partnership interactions are maximum message equilibria – in which case
there exists a type of player with a higher level of reneging aversion whose interactions with
incumbent-type players result in a maximum message equilibrium (this fact is proven in Lemma
5), and yield them a higher payoff than the incumbent-type players achieve when playing against
themselves.
4 Partial Observability
In this section we extend the model endogenising reneging costs to allow for cases in which
players sometimes do not observe their partner’s level of reneging aversion.
4.1 Population Game with Partial Observability
In what follows, we describe the adaptations to the model in Section 3.1 required to accommodate
partial observability. Let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of matches in which both players observe
their partner’s level of reneging aversion. That is, we assume that when the agents are randomly
matched into pairs, in a share of q of the pairs, both agents observe their partner’s reneging
aversion, while in the remaining 1 − q of the pairs the partners are “strangers,” and neither of
them observes any information about their partner’s reneging aversion. One may interpret the
observation of reneging aversion to be the result of obtaining information about a partner’s past
behaviour (either through direct observation or by communicating with agents who interacted
with the partner in the past), and with this interpretation q may represent how likely it is that
agents who are matched together have prior information about each other.
For tractability, we make the simplifying assumption that the observations of the two matched
agents are perfectly correlated, i.e., that an agent observes her partner’s reneging aversion if
and only if the partner observes the agent’s reneging aversion (similar to the model of partial
observability in Heifetz et al., 2007a), while leaving the extension to more general observation
structures for future research.
Consider a setup in which the incumbent agents have reneging aversion λ ∈ R+, while
occasionally one of the agents is endowed with a different level of reneging aversion (henceforth,
amutant). Let pino (λ′, λ|λ) be the material payoff of a mutant (she) with a reneging aversion of λ′
who faces an incumbent partner (he) with a reneging aversion of λ who believes with probability
one that his partner has a reneging aversion of λ. Note that this belief is consistent with a
situation in which a single mutant experiments with a different level of reneging aversion within
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an infinite population of agents. The partner plays his part of the unique perfect equilibrium of
the game G (λ, λ), while the mutant plays her best reply to his strategy.
Given λ, λ′ ∈ R+, let Gq(λ, λ′|λ) denote a partnership game between an incumbent with
reneging aversion λ and a mutant with reneging aversion λ′ in which both players observe their
partner’s reneging aversion with a probability of q, and neither of them observes their partner’s
reneging aversion with the remaining probability of 1−q. In this latter case, both players believe
with probability one that the partner has the incumbents’ reneging aversion of λ. Let piq (λ′, λ|λ)
be the mutant’s material payoff in Gq(λ, λ′|λ):
piq (λ′, λ|λ) = q · pi (λ′, λ) + (1− q) · pino (λ′, λ|λ)
Observe that when q = 1, this coincides with the model of perfect observability in Section 3,
while the case of q = 0 corresponds to the non-observability of the partner’s reneging aversion.
We say that the level of reneging aversion λ ∈ R+ is a symmetric pure (strict) Nash
equilibrium in the population game with partial observability level q if for each λ′ ∈ R+,
piq (λ′, λ|λ) ≤ pi (λ, λ) (piq (λ′, λ|λ) < pi (λ, λ)).
As in the case of perfect observability discussed above, stable homogeneous population states
correspond to symmetric pure equilibria of the population game. Specifically:
1. Any symmetric strict equilibrium corresponds to a stable homogeneous population state
in which all the incumbents have the same level of reneging aversion.
2. Any homogeneous stable population state must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Robustness of Theorem 2
The following result demonstrates the robustness of Theorem 2 to almost perfect observability.
We show that λ+c is a symmetric strict equilibrium for any q < 1 that is sufficiently close to one.
Formally:
Theorem 3. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24). Then, there exists q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that (λ+c , λ+c ) is a strict
equilibrium of the population game with observability level q for each q ∈ [q¯, 1]. Moreover, the
equilibrium satisfies all properties (1–5) in the statement of Theorem 2.
4.3 Non-robustness of No-Effort Equilibrium
We recover a central result from the evolutionary literature on the stability of payoff-maximising
preferences under anonymity but show that it is not robust to any positive probability of cor-
related observation of types in our model. The following simple result shows that when there
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is no observability (i.e., q = 0) no effort is exerted in any equilibrium of the population game.
Formally:
Proposition 1. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24), and let q = 0. In any symmetric pure Nash equilibrium,
all agents exert an effort of zero on the equilibrium path, and any agent i with λi > 0 sends a
message of zero.
This result is similar to those in the existing literature that show that when agents are
matched uniformly and anonymously (i.e., no observability or assortativity) and the selection
dynamics are payoff monotone, then players maximise their material payoffs in any stable pop-
ulation state (see, e.g., Ok & Vega-Redondo, 2001; Dekel et al., 2007).6
Next we show that the no-effort equilibrium is not robust to the presence of any arbitrarily
low level of observability. In particular, we show that for any arbitrarily small q > 0, the
agents must exert positive effort on the equilibrium path, which implies that they make positive
promises and have a positive level of reneging aversion.
Proposition 2. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24) and q > 0. Then, in any symmetric pure Nash equilibrium,
players exert positive levels of effort on the equilibrium path.
This result demonstrates that even with low levels of observability of reneging aversion,
evolutionary dynamics will take the population away from any cheap talk state in which players
are unable to make and keep promises.
5 Discussion
5.1 Application to Quality Choice in Supply Chains
Our analysis has potential applications in a wide number of fields. We give one example from
industrial organisation. Consider two firms in a supply chain where the first firm produces an
intermediate good and the second firm the final good. Imagine that the firms sign a contract
where firm 1 supplies a quantity of intermediate goods to firm 2 on condition that firm 2
will then produce an amount of final goods, sell these, and split the revenues with firm 1.
The firms are contractually obliged to produce a certain quantity of goods but the quality of
production is not contractible (consider an industry such as food production where quality is
hard to measure objectively). In this case, we can think of the partnership game explored above
as representing a game where the firms choose levels of production quality after the contract to
6A notable exception is Frenkel et al. (2017) who present a plausible model of evolutionary dynamics that
are not payoff-monotone due to sexual inheritance in a biological process, or due to combining traits from more
than one mentor in a social learning process. They show that in such processes, stable population states do not
correspond to Nash equilibria of the underlying material payoff game.
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produce is signed. Plausibly, an increase in the quality of one firm’s production will increase
the marginal revenue gained by increasing the quality of the production of the other firm, but
a firm’s quality of production will come at an increasing marginal cost to that firm. When the
managers of firms can communicate about their planned production quality, this may facilitate
successful supply chains so long as the managers do not simply renege on any agreement. Our
analysis suggests that competition in which management styles become more prevalent when
they are relatively profitable will select firms run by managers with some tendency to fulfill
non-contractual agreements, even when this does not maximise profits.
5.2 Mixed and asymmetric equilibria in the population game.
Our formal results above focused primarily on symmetric pure equilibria. In what follows we
comment on the extension of our results to mixed and asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 shows that (λ+c , λ+c ) is the unique symmetric and pure equilibrium of the popu-
lation game. Numeric analysis suggests the following stronger result also holds. The population
game does not admit any other Nash equilibrium (i.e., (λ+c , λ+c ) is uniquely stable when allowing
also for mixed equilibria and asymmetric equilibria).7 We leave the analytic verification of this
conjecture (which, we believe, holds also for partial observability with a sufficiently high q) for
future research.
It is relatively straightforward to extend Propositions 1 and 2 to mixed equilibria and to
asymmetric equilibria. We refrain from doing so in order to simplify the notation of Section 4 (the
formal definition of symmetric equilibria requires a somewhat more complicated notation). The
arguments presented in the proofs of both propositions hold with minor changes also for mixed
and asymmetric equilibria, and it can be shown that: (1) if q = 0, then all incumbents exert
zero effort in any equilibrium of the population game, and (2) for any q > 0 in any equilibrium
of the population game, a positive share of incumbent agents exert positive effort with positive
probability (and, thus, also make positive promises, and are endowed with positive reneging
aversion). Thus, the endowment of players with positive levels of reneging aversion in stable
population states is a robust property that holds for any positive level of partial observability
(at least with the simplifying assumption of perfect correlation between the observations of the
two matched agents).
7The extension to asymmetric equilibria is especially interesting in setups in which the partnership game is
played between agents from two different populations of complementary skills, and a stable state of the two
populations corresponds to a possibly asymmetric Nash equilibrium of the two-population game (see the related
setup studied in Ritzberger & Weibull, 1995).
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5.3 Refinements of Continuous Stability
By using strict equilibrium and Nash equilibrium as our solution concepts describing stable
population states, we implicitly assume that a stable population state has to be resistant only to
perturbations in which a few agents change their reneging aversion. Eshel (1983) argues that in
some setups one should also require stability against perturbation in which many (or all) agents
slightly change their reneging aversion. Eshel presents the notion of continuous stable strategy
to capture stability also against the latter kind of perturbations, and Oechssler & Riedel (2001)
further refine it by presenting the notion of evolutionary robustness, which requires stability
against all small perturbations consistent with the weak topology (see also the related notions of
stability in Milchtaich, 2016). Population state λ∗ is evolutionarily robust if an agent with cost
λ∗ outperforms other agents (on average) in any sufficiently close perturbed population state
µ ∈ ∆ (R+), i.e.,
∑
λ∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · pi (λ∗, λ) > ∑
λ,λ′∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · µ (λ′) · pi (λ, λ′) (11)
One can show that the population state (λ+c , λ+c ) satisfies a slightly weaker version of the evo-
lutionary robustness refinement of (11). Specifically, it satisfies the weak inequality counterpart
of Eq. (11) for any sufficiently close µ ∈ ∆ (R+), and it satisfies the strict inequality whenever µ
assigns positive mass to agents having a reneging aversion of at most λ+c . The intuition is that
agents with a slightly higher reneging aversion (i.e., strictly above λ+c ) play a no-effort equilib-
rium against all agents in the perturbed state µ. Thus, they are trivially weakly outperformed
by a level of aversion λ+c , and strictly outperformed as long as µ includes some agents with
a reneging aversion of at most λ+c (against whom an agent with reneging aversion λ+c achieves
strictly positive payoffs). Finally, minor modifications to the arguments presented in the proof of
Theorem 2 show that agents with a reneging aversion strictly below λ+c are strictly outperformed
by agents with a reneging aversion of λ+c .
5.4 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
We have demonstrated the evolutionary stability of an intermediate level of reneging aversion in
a class of partnership games. This result is robust to players observing their partner’s reneging
aversion with only some sufficiently high probability less than 1. Notably, with any positive
probability of correlated observation of levels of reneging aversion, positive effort is sustained
in the partnership game in any stable state. These results demonstrate a strong tendency for
evolution to select preferences for the partial keeping of promises. In stable populations, we
see players making slightly “overoptimistic” promises and, while these are not fully realised, the
outcome is welfare maximising among symmetric equilibria of the game. This outcome stands in
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sharp contrast to the cheap talk prediction of no effort ever being exerted in these partnerships.
We have here developed the first evolutionary analysis of a direct concern for keeping one’s
word. In doing so, we give an evolutionary explanation of several key observations in the
related empirical literature. In our model, a population of players with the stable level of
reneging aversion will exert no effort if they are not allowed to communicate before choosing
their actions, but the opportunity to send messages will lead to promises being made and higher
levels of effort being exerted. This replicates the experimental finding of Charness & Dufwenberg
(2006) that players are significantly more likely to make “cooperative” choices in a partnership
setting when they have the ability to communicate before playing.8 Secondly, in the presence of
communication, the degree of cooperation in our model is both incomplete (some reneging always
takes place) and sensitive to the returns from the partnership. Charness & Dufwenberg (2006)
find that: (1) not all pairs make choices that achieve the cooperative outcome, (2) most players
keep promises to play the cooperative action but some players break their promise, and (3)
players are less likely to promise and achieve cooperation when the return from not cooperating
is high.
Finally, we model a cost of promise-breaking per se rather than a cost of disappointing others’
payoff expectations (so-called guilt aversion). While Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) explain
their experimental findings with a model of guilt aversion, Vanberg (2008) demonstrates that
both a direct cost of promise-breaking (i.e., reneging aversion) and guilt aversion can rationalise
the findings of Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), but introduces variants of the partnership game
experiments where only reneging costs are able to explain observed behaviour. In these variants,
some players who have made promises are randomly re-matched with an alternative partner
before choices are made in the subsequent subgame. Both the old and new partners of these
players are unaware of the switch but the players find out the promise that had already been
made to their new partner by a different player. Players’ propensity to keep their promises is
sensitive to whether they are re-matched in this way, suggesting that it is a concern with keeping
a promise they have made rather than a concern with their partner’s payoff expectations that
motivates them to keep their word.
This research brings support to the focus of experimental and theoretical research on direct
costs of lying or reneging on one’s word in communication settings. Future research could explore
the robustness of the stability of intermediate reneging aversion in alternative types of games
and with more general information structures about preferences. Finally, following Alger &
Weibull (2013), we conjecture that evolution under positive assortative matching could support
the stability of non-cheap talk preferences even when types are unobserved.
8The appendix of Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) provides the text of the messages sent by players that
demonstrates that they were indeed often used to make explicit promises about their own future action.
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A Trembling-Hand Perfection
In this section we define the refinement of trembling-hand perfection in our setup in which each
player has a continuous set of pure actions at each stage of the game. There are various ways in
which one can apply the notion of trembling-hand perfection to a game with a continuous set
of actions. In what follows, we choose one approach, mainly for its simplicity. All of our results
hold for any plausible way in which one can apply trembling-hand perfection to this setup.
We begin by defining a perturbed partnership game in which each player may tremble with a
small probability in the first stage and randomly choose a message from an arbitrary distribution
with full support. Formally:
Definition 1. A perturbed partnership game is described by a tuple ζ = (, σ˜), where  ∈ (0, 1)
is the probability that each agent sends in the first stage of the game a message sampled from
the full-support distribution σ˜ ∈ ∆ (S).
Remark 5. All of our results remain the same if one defines a perturbed game to include also a
tremble at the second stage. As this alternative approach makes the notations more complicated,
without affecting any of the results, we choose to present the simpler Definition 1.
Definition 2. A behaviour strategy of player i is a pair (σi, χi (si, sj)), where σi ∈ ∆ (S) is a
distribution over the set of messages and χi (si, sj) is the distribution of efforts exerted at the
second stage as a function of the observed messages in the first stage (s1, s2). Given a behaviour
strategy (σi, χi (si, sj)) , let (σi, χi (si, sj))ζ = ((1− ) · σi +  · σ˜i, χi (si, sj)) be the perturbed
strategy according to which player i chooses a message according to σi with probability (1− ),
and “trembles” and chooses a message according to σ˜ otherwise, and in the second stage she
chooses an effort according to χi (si, sj), where (si, sj) is the realised message profile in stage
one.
A strategy profile is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium if it is the limit of Nash equilibria
of a converging sequence of perturbed games. Formally,
Definition 3. A strategy profile ((σi, χi (si, sj)) , (σj, χj (si, sj))) is a Nash equilibrium of the
perturbed partnership game ζ = (, σ˜, ) if each strategy (σi, xi (si, sj)) is a best reply against the
opponent’s perturbed strategy (σj, χj (si, sj))ζ .
Definition 4. A strategy profile ((σi, χi (si, sj)) , (σj, χj (si, sj))) is a trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium if there exist distributions σ˜, χ˜ ∈ ∆ (S), converging sequences of positive numbers
(n1 )n , (n2 )n → 0 , and a converging sequence of strategy profiles
(
(σni , χni (si, sj)) ,
(
σnj , χ
n
j (si, sj)
))
n
→ ((σi, χi (si, sj)) , (σj, χj (si, sj))), such that each strategy profile
(
(σni , χni (si, sj)) ,
(
σnj , χ
n
j (si, sj)
))
is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed partnership game (n1 , n2 , σ˜, χ˜).
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Fact 2. Similar to the standard definition of trembling-hand perfection in games with a finite set
of actions (Selten, 1975), one can show that: (1) each partnership game admits a trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium, and (2) each trembling-hand perfect equilibrium satisfies subgame perfection.
The arguments are standard and are omitted for brevity. These observations imply that any
unique subgame perfect equilibrium also satisfies trembling-hand perfection.
B Characterization of the Perfect Equilibria when λj = 0
In what follows we formally characterise the perfect equilibria of the partnership game in the
case where one player has zero reneging aversion
Proposition 3. Assume that λi > λj = 0.
1. If λi > 1c(2−c2) − c (which implies that Θi < 0 and Ri = ∞), then there is a unique
continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in which si = 1 and sj ∈ [0, 1].
2. If λi < 1c(2−c2)−c (which implies that Θi > 0 and Ri = 0), then there is a unique continuum
of subgame perfect equilibria in which si = 0 and sj ∈ [0, 1].
3. If λi = 1c(2−c2) − c (which implies that Θi = 0), then for any (si, sj) ∈ S × S, there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium in which the messages are (si, sj).
In all cases, all subgame perfect equilibria are trembling-hand perfect.
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C Various Lemmas (For Online Publication)
C.1 Conditions for the Existence of Each Best-Response Type
Lemma 1. Θi ≤ 0 (which implies that player i sends the maximum message in all cases) if and
only if
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c
Proof. The best response function set out in Eq. (10) implies that each player i always best
responds with the maximum message, for all sj, if and only if Θi ≤ 0. By the definition of Θi:
Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ c(c+ λj) + 1(c+ λi)(c+ λj) − 2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)(c+ λi) + 1(c+ λj) − 2(c+ λi) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ 2c− 1
c+ λj
− c2(c+ λj)
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ − 1
c+ λj
− c(c(c+ λj)− 2)
Where the second “ ⇐⇒ ” is obtained by multiplying by (c + λi) and the third and fourth by
gathering terms in λi and rearranging. To solve for λi we then divide by (c(c+ λj)− 2). There
are two solutions: one for when (c(c+ λj)− 2) is positive, and one for when it is negative:
λi ≤ −1(c+ λj)[c(c+ λj)− 2] − c < 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0 (12)
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c > 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 < 0 (13)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (12) implies that λi < 0, which is ruled out by
assumption. Therefore, we have that Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ Eq. (13) holds. Rearranging the second
inequality in Eq. (13) to give a condition in terms of λj yields the lemma.
Lemma 2. λjΘi > 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some multiple (greater
1
than 1) of player j’s message) if and only if:
(
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < λi < 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c
and λj <
2
c
− c
)
OR,
(
λi >
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c
and
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
)
Proof. Eq. (10) implies that a player best responds by playing a (greater than 1) multiple of
her opponent’s message, sj, if and only if λjΘi > 1. By the definition of Θi:
λj
Θi
> 1 ⇐⇒ λj
c(c+ λ−i) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
> 1 (14)
Since λj ≥ 0, this holds if and only if
λj > c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 > 0 (15)
The second of these inequalities is the requirement that Θi > 0, which is the converse of the
condition derived for Lemma 1 and holds when
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c or λj >
2
c
− c (16)
It is straightforward to see that if the second inequality in Eq. (16) holds, then 2− c(c+λj) < 0
and hence the first inequality implies λi < 0. Therefore, imposing λi ≥ 0, we have that Θi > 0
if and only if
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c and λj <
2
c
− c
OR, λj ≥ 2
c
− c (17)
2
The first inequality in Eq. (15) holds if and only if
λj >c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2
⇐⇒ λi(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) > −c(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) + 1
c+ λj
(18)
This ⇐⇒ is obtained by multiplying by (c+ λi) and rearranging. To solve for λi, we divide by
(λj + 2− c(c + λj)). There are two solutions: one for when (λj + 2− c(c + λj)) is positive and
one for when it is negative:
λi >
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c > 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) > 0 (19)
λi ≤ 1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) < 0 (20)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (20) implies that λi < 0. This is ruled out by assump-
tion, and so we have that the first inequality in Eq. (15) ⇐⇒ Eq. (19) holds. Rearranging the
second inequality in Eq. (19) to give a condition in terms of λj and combining with Eq. (17)
yields the lemma.
Lemma 3. 0 < λjΘi < 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some fraction (less
than 1) of player j’s message) if and only if
(
λi <
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
)
OR, λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1
Proof. To obtain Lemma 3, we can see that Eq. (10) implies that a player will best respond by
sending a message lower than her opponent if and only if 0 < λjΘi < 1. This again implies that
Θi > 0 and so Eq. (17) must hold. We also must have that λjΘi < 1. In the proof of Lemma 2
it was demonstrated that λjΘi > 1 ⇐⇒ Eq. (19) holds. By taking the converse of Eq. (19) we
have that λjΘi < 1 if and only if
λi <
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c or λj + 2− c(c+ λj) ≤ 0 (21)
As was also demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 2, if both conditions in Eq. (21) hold
simultaneously, this implies that λi < 0. Therefore, imposing λi ≥ 0 and rearranging the second
inequality in Eq. (21) yields that λjΘi < 1 if and only if
3
λi <
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 (22)
OR, λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1 (23)
From the proof of Lemma 2, we have that Θi > 0 if and only if
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c and λj <
2
c
− c (24)
OR, λj ≥ 2
c
− c (25)
It is straightforward to see that Eq. (23) implies Eq. (25). We can also see that Eq. (22) implies
Eq. (24) as
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < 1(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c
⇐⇒ 1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
<
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)]
⇐⇒ (c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] <λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 2c− c2 − λjc2 + 2λj − λjc2 − λ2jc <λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 0 <λ2j + λ2jc
Therefore, Θi > 0 is implied by λjΘi < 1, when λi ≥ 0 is imposed, and so Eq. (22) and Eq. (23)
can be combined to yield the lemma.
C.2 Additional Lemmas
C.2.1 Lemma 4 (Used in Proof of Theorem 2)
Lemma 4. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). For all λj ≥ 0 there exists a λi ≥ 0 such that in the unique
perfect equilibrium of the game G(λi, λj), player i achieves a strictly-positive material payoff,
i.e., pi(λi, λj) > 0.
Proof. Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 say that if Ri =∞, or Rj =∞, or Ri ·Rj > 1, then either
si = 1 or sj = 1 in the unique equilibrium of G(λi, λj). We show that for all λj ≥ 0 there exists
a λi ≥ 0 such that at least one of these conditions holds.
We first show that if λj > 81140 then setting λi = 0 yields Θj < 0, which, by definition, implies
Rj = ∞. To see this, first use the definition of Θj to write the condition Θj < 0 when λi = 0,
4
and rearrange it to yield a lower bound on λj:
c2 + 1(c+ λj)c
− 2 < 0 ⇐⇒ 1
c+ λj
< c
(
2− c2
)
⇐⇒ 1
c (2− c2) − c < λj (26)
The first derivative of this lower bound with respect to c is
3c2 − 2
(2c− c3)2 − 1 (27)
Eq. (27) is positive for c < 1.25. The lower bound on λj given by Eq. (26) therefore attains
its highest value when c = 1.25. This value is 81140 ≈ 0.578. We therefore have that for all
λj >
81
140 , λi = 0 implies Θj < 0 and hence Rj =∞.
We next show that for λj ≤ 81140 , then for λi sufficiently large, either Θi ≤ 0 or Ri · Rj > 1.
We take the limit of Θi as λi →∞ and find the conditions under which this is negative:
lim
λi→∞
Θi ≤ 0⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 ≤ 0⇐⇒ λj ≤ 2
c
− c (28)
Next, we check the condition for satisfying λi·λjΘj ·Θi > 1, which implies that Ri · Rj > 1. We
take the limit of λi·λjΘi·Θj as λi →∞:
lim
λi→∞
λi · λj
Θi ·Θj = limλi→∞
 λi
c(c+ λj) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
· λj
c(c+ λi) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2

= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c(c+ λi)− 2
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c · λi
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi · λj
c · λi (c(c+ λj)− 2)
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
]
= λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] ,
where the second equality is derived from neglecting the term 1(c+λi)(c+λj) , which converges to
zero as λi → ∞, in each denominator, and the third equality is derived by neglecting the term
c2 − 2, which is negligible with respect to c · λi when taking the limit λi → ∞, in the second
denominator.
We then determine the conditions under which this limit is greater than 1:
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] > 1⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0 and λj < c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
⇐⇒ 2
c
− c < λj < c
c2 − 1 − c (29)
5
Observe that the first inequality in Eq. (29) holds precisely when Eq. (28) does not hold.
The first derivative of the right-hand side of the second inequality in Eq. (29) is c2−c4−2(c2−1)2 , which
is clearly negative for all c > 1. When evaluated at c = 1.25, the right-hand side of the second
inequality in Eq. (29) is 3536 >
81
140 . Therefore, for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , this second inequality
holds. We therefore have that for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , either Θi ≤ 0 or λi·λjΘj ·Θi > 1, when λi
is sufficiently high.
Therefore, for all c < 1.25 and for all λj ≥ 0, there exists a λi ≥ 0 such that either si = 1 or
sj = 1 in the unique equilibrium of the game G(λi, λj). To demonstrate that player i achieves
positive payoff in equilibrium, we first note that in each of the above cases, there is at least one
player who both sends a positive message and has positive reneging aversion, which by Eq. (6)
implies that both players exert positive effort in equilibrium. Remark 2 implies that the payoff
to a player exerting positive effort in equilibrium is strictly positive.
C.2.2 Lemma 5 (Used in Proof of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3)
Lemma 5. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24). Let Cc be the set of pairs (λi, λj) such that the game Gc(λi, λj)
admits the perfect equilibrium with si = sj = 1 (i.e., maximum message equilibrium) and let
λc ≡ min {λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cc} and let λ+c ≡ max {λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cc}. Then (1) for all λ ∈ [λc, λ+c ),
there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ [λ, λ + δλ), Gc(λ′ , λ) admits a maximum message
equilibrium. (2) For all λ′ 6= λ+c , (λ′ , λ+c ) /∈ Cc.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 derives Eq. (31) and the corresponding condition for player j,
which together define Cc. By the strict convexity of the right-hand side of the first inequality in
Eq. (31), we know that there can be at most two solutions to Eq. (33) and that for λj > λ+c ,
the right-hand side of the first inequality in Eq. (31) is increasing in λj. This means that for
λi = λj > λ+c , Eq. (31) does not hold. Analogously, for λi = λj < λc, Eq. (31) does not
hold either. Therefore, if the second inequality in Eq. (31) holds when λi = λj = λc and when
λi = λj = λ+c , these two points are the maximum and minimum symmetric points in Cc. Given
λ+c > λc, the second inequality in Eq. (31) holds in both of these cases if and only if
λ+c <
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) =
1 + 2c− c2 +√5− 4c
2(c− 1) <
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− c2 +√5− 4c < 4− 2c2
⇐⇒ 3− 2c+√5− 4c > 0
⇐⇒ c < 1.25
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By the convexity of Cc, we therefore have that for all λ ∈ [λc,λ+c ], (λ, λ) ∈ Cc. The strict
convexity of the first inequality of Eq. (31) defining the boundary of Cc, implies that for all
λ ∈ (λc, λ+c ), (λ, λ) is not on the boundary of Cc and is therefore in the interior of Cc. By the
definition of an interior point of a convex set, for all λ ∈ (λc, λ+c ), there exists a δλ > 0 such that
for all λ′ ∈ [λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Cc.
To complete the proof of (1), we show that there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈
[λc, λc + δλ), (λ
′
, λc) ∈ Cc. This will be the case if and only if there is δλ > 0 such that Eq. (31)
holds whenever λi = λc and λj ∈ [λc, λc + δλ). This will be case if and only if Eq. (31) does
not become “tighter” as λj increases, i.e., if and only if the derivative of the right-hand side of
the first inequality of Eq. (31) is less than or equal to zero when evaluated at λj = λc. The
derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (31) with respect to λj is
c(2c+ 2λj − 1)− 2(1 + λj)
(λj + c)2[λj(c− 1) + c2 − 2]2 (30)
When evaluated at λj = λc, Eq. (30) is non-positive if9 c >
√
5 − 1 ≈ 1.24. Therefore, we
have that for all λ ∈ [λc, λ+c ), there exists a δλ > 0 such that for all λ′ ∈ [λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Cc,
and therefore Gc(λ
′
, λ) admits a maximum message equilibrium.
Point (2) is easily established by noting first that the right-hand side of the first inequality
of Eq. (31) must be increasing in λj when evaluated at λ+c (and at any λ > λ+c ) as this is the
second point at which this strictly convex function crosses the 45 degree line (the first being
λc). Therefore, given that λ+c satisfies Eq. (33), an increase in λj with λi fixed at λ+c means
that Eq. (31) does not hold. By symmetry, an increase in λi with λj fixed at λ+c means that
the equivalent condition on λj is violated. Secondly, it is straightforward to see that given that
λ+c satisfies Eq. (33), when λj is fixed at λ+c , any λi < λ+c must violate the first inequality in
Eq. (31). Therefore, for any λ′ 6= λ+c , (λ′ , λ+c ) /∈ C, and therefore Gc(λ′ , λ+c ) does not admit a
maximum message equilibrium.
D Proofs of Main Results (For Online Publication)
D.1 Proof of Theorem 1
1. If min (Ri, Rj) > 1, then, by the definition of Ri and Rj, either (a) Θi > 0 and Θj > 0
and λjΘi > 1 and
λi
Θj > 1, or (b) Θi > 0 and
λj
Θi > 1 and Θj = 0, or (c) Θi > 0 and
λj
Θi > 1 and Θj < 0, or (d) Θi = Θj = 0, or (e) Θi = 0 and Θj < 0, or (f) Θi < 0 and
9This final result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this
paper.
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Θj < 0. In case (a), by the unique best-response function derived in Eq. (10), equilibrium
messages in this class of games satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj, 1} and s∗j = min{ λiΘj si, 1}. These
equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case
(b), Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1
if µσj > 0 and s∗j ∈ ∆(S) if µσj = 0. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if
and only if s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (c), Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy
s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1 . These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only
if s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (d), Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1
if µσj > 0 and s∗i ∈ [0, 1] if µσj = 0 and s∗j = 1 if µσi > 0 and s∗j ∈ [0, 1] if µσi = 0.
These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 1.
In case (e), Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and
s∗j = 1. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 1. In case (f),
Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 and s∗j = 1, which implies that
s∗i = s∗j = 1.
This implies that in all six cases (a, b, c, d, e, and f) the strategy profile
((1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (1, xe2 (s1, s2))) is a subgame perfect equilibrium. It is unique (and, thus,
also satisfies trembling-hand perfection) in cases (b), (c), (e), and (f). In cases (a) and (d),
the strategy profile ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) is the only additional subgame perfect
equilibrium. In what follows we show that the equilibrium ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2)))
fails to satisfy trembling-hand perfection in case (a). Let  > 0 be sufficiently small such
that λjΘi · (1− ) > 1. Let σ˜ be an arbitrary distribution of messages with full support.
Let ((sˆ1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (sˆ2, xe2 (s1, s2))) be a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game ζ =
(, σ˜) that satisfies sˆ1, sˆ2 < 1. This implies that each message sˆi is a best reply against
the perturbed strategy (sˆj, xe2 (s1, s2))ζ , which is possible only if the following equation is
satisfied for each player i:
sˆi =
λj
Θi
· µ(sˆj)ζ =
λj
Θi
· ((1− ) · sˆj +  · µσ˜)
Observe that sˆi = λjΘi · ((1− ) · sˆj +  · µσ˜) > sˆj. By the same argument the anal-
ogous equation in which i is replaced by j yields sˆj > sˆi, and we get a contradic-
tion for ((sˆ1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (sˆ2, xe2 (s1, s2))) being a Nash equilibrium. This implies that
((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) does not satisfy trembling-hand perfection, and that
((1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (1, xe2 (s1, s2))) is the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium also in case
(a).
Next, we show the additional results on the set of pairs (λi, λj) such that min (Ri, Rj) > 1.
By the definition of Ri, we recall that Ri ≥ 1 if and only if (1) Θi ≤ 0 or (2) Θi > 0 and
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λj
Θi ≥ 1. We can recall from Lemma 1 that Θi ≤ 0 if and only if
λi ≥ 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c
We can recall from Lemma 2 that Θi > 0 and λjΘi ≥ 1 if and only if
1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c ≤ λi < 1(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and
λj <
2
c
− c
or
λi ≥ 1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
Combining these conditions yields Ri ≥ 1 if and only if
λi ≥ 1
λ2j(1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 (31)
We will first show that the set of points that satisfies Eq. (31) is convex. First, observe
that the second derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (31) (the
lower bound on λi) with respect to λj is
2[3c4 + (6λj − 3)c3 + (3λ2j − 9λj − 5)c2 + 3λ2j + 6λj + 4]
(λj + c)[2− c2 − λj(c− 1)] (32)
The numerator of this expression is positive for all λj > 0 and10 c > 1 . This expression
is therefore positive if and only if the denominator is positive, which clearly holds if and
only if the expression in square brackets is positive:
2− c2 − λj(c− 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
This is the second inequality of Eq. (31). Therefore, the set of points that satisfy Eq.
10Eq. (32) and the conditions for the positive numerator are derived using Mathematica. The code is available
in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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(31) lies above a strictly convex function and is therefore a convex set. By the symmetry
of the conditions for player j, we have that the set of points such that Rj > 1 is also
convex. The intersection of two convex sets is a convex set. Therefore the set of points
such that min (Ri, Rj) > 1 (denoted by Cc) is convex. By the symmetry of Eq. (31) and
its equivalent for j (which together define the set Cc), we have that Cc is symmetric (in
the sense that (λi, λj) ∈ Cc ⇐⇒ (λj, λi) ∈ Cc ).
We now establish the interval of c in which Cc is non-empty. By the convexity and symmetry
of Cc, if this set is non-empty there must be a maximum and a minimum λ such that
(λ, λ) ∈ Cc. We now show that when c < 1.25 such maximum and minimum elements
exist. Clearly, the maximum and minimum λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cc are the largest and
smallest values of λ such that Eq. (31) holds when λi = λj = λ. Given that Cc is convex,
these maximum and minimum values must obtain when at least one of the inequalities in
Eq. (31) holds with equality. To find the maximum and minimum values of λ that satisfy
the first inequality in Eq. (31), we solve the corresponding equality when λi = λj = λ.
We then show that these are the largest and smallest values satisfying both inequalities
simultaneously. Imposing λi = λj = λ on the first inequality in Eq. (31), we obtain
λ = 1
λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c (33)
Multiplying by λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) and rearranging yields
λ3
[
1− c
]
+ λ2
[
2 + 2c− 3c2
]
+ λ
[
4c− 3c3 + c2
]
−
[
c2 − 1
]2
= 0 (34)
Eq. (34) has two solutions when λ is positive:
λ = 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) −
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λc (35)
λ = 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λ
+
c (36)
Clearly these two solutions are defined if and only if c < 1.25. By inspection of Eq. (35)
and Eq. (36), it is straightforward to see that for all 1 < c < 1.25, 0 < λc < λ+c < ∞.
To see that min (Ri, Rj) > 1 implies that λc ≤ max (λi, λj) ≤ λ+c , note first that by the
definition of λc and λ+c as the minimum and maximum λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cc and by the
convexity of Cc, we have that (λ, λ) /∈ Cc for each λ ∈ [0, λc)∪ [λ+c ,∞). Assume that there
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exist λi, λj < λc such that (λi, λj) ∈ Cc. By the symmetry of Cc, we have (λj, λi) ∈ Cc. Let
λk = λi+λj2 <λc. By the convexity of Cc, we have (λk, λk) ∈ Cc, which is a contradiction.
This establishes that (λi, λj) ∈ Cc implies that λc ≤ max (λi, λj). By assuming that there
exist a λi, λj > λ+c such that (λi, λj) ∈ Cc, we can derive a contradiction in an analogous
way.
Finally, we consider the case where λc < λi < λ+c < λj. We have established above that
the right-hand side of the first inequality in Eq. (31) is strictly convex and crosses the 45
degree line for the second time at λi = λj = λ+, which implies that for all λj ≥ λ+c this
function is increasing in λj and yields a lower bound on λi greater than λ+c , which is a
contradiction. We therefore have that λ+c < max (λi, λj) implies (λi, λj) /∈ Cc and hence
(λi, λj) ∈ Cc implies max (λi, λj) ≤ λ+. Combining the two bounds on max (λi, λj) and
recalling that by definition (λi, λj) ∈ Cc ⇐⇒ min (Ri, Rj) > 1 completes the proof.
2. If Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj then, by the definition of Ri and Rj, either (a) Θi < 0 and Θj > 0
and λiΘj < 1, or (b) Θi = 0 and Θj > 0 and
λi
Θj < 1, or (c) Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and
λj
Θi · λiΘj > 1. In case (a) Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 and
s∗j = λiΘj si. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if 1 = s
∗
i > s
∗
j > 0.
In case (b), Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and
s∗i ∈ [0, 1] if µσj = 0 and s∗j = λiΘj si. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and
only if 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 0. In case (c) Eq. (10) implies that equilibrium
messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj, 1} and s∗j = λiΘj si. Given that
λj
Θi · λiΘj > 1, these equations
are simultaneously satisfied if and only if 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0 or s∗i = s∗j = 0. In all three cases
(a, b and c), there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 1 = s∗i > s∗j > 0. This is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in case (a) and therefore it must satisfy trembling-
hand perfection. In cases (b) and (c) there exists also a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which s∗i = s∗j = 0.
Next we show that this latter subgame perfect equilibrium
((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) fails to satisfy trembling-hand perfection in cases (b) and
(c). Assume to the contrary that ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) satisfies trembling-hand
perfection. This implies that there exists a distribution of messages with full support σ˜ and
¯ > 0, such that for each 0 <  < ¯, ((sˆ1, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (sˆ2, xe2 (s1, s2))) is a Nash equilibrium
of the perturbed game ζ = (, σ˜) that satisfies sˆ1, sˆ2 < 1. This implies that each message
sˆi is a best reply against the perturbed strategy (sˆj, xe2 (s1, s2))ζ . We begin with case
(b). Observe that the expected signal of player j is positive, which implies, due to the
second condition in Eq. (10), that the unique best-reply of player i is the maximal message
sˆi = 1, and we get a contradiction. Turning to case (c), let 0 <  < ¯ be sufficiently small
such that λjΘi · λiΘj · (1− )
2 > 1. This implies that each message sˆi is a best reply against
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the perturbed strategy (sˆj, xe2 (s1, s2))ζ , which is possible only if the following equation is
satisfied for each player i:
sˆi =
λj
Θi
· µ(sˆj)ζ =
λj
Θi
· ((1− ) · sˆj +  · µσ˜)
Observe that the right-hand side is strictly positive for any value of sˆj ∈ [0, 1], which
implies that sˆi > 0 for each player i. Substituting the value of sˆj from the analogous
equation sˆj = λjΘi · µ(sˆi)ζ yields
sˆi =
λj
Θi
·
(
(1− ) · λiΘj · ((1− ) · sˆi +  · µσ˜) +  · µσ˜
)
Simplifying the equation yields
sˆi =
(1− ) · λiΘj ·  · µσ˜ +  · µσ˜
1− (1− )2 · λjΘi · λiΘj
,
which implies that sˆi is negative (because the numerator is positive while the denominator
is negative), and we get a contradiction.
Finally, we show that there exist λi, λj > 0 such that Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj if and only if
c <
√
2. We first show that Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj =⇒ c <
√
2. By the definition of Ri, we
have that Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj implies either Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi > 1. From Lemma 1 and Lemma
2, we see that this implies either λj <
2
c
− c or λj < 2−c2c−1 , both of which imply c <
√
2,
given that λj > 0. Next we show that c <
√
2 implies that there exist λi, λj > 0 such that
Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj. Again, c <
√
2 =⇒ 2
c
− c > 0, and so Lemma 1 tells us that for any
λj <
2
c
− c and λi sufficiently large, we have Θi ≤ 0. The equivalent of Lemma 3 for player
j tells us that if λi ≥ 2−c2c−1 then for any λj we have λiΘj < 1 (and hence Θj > 0 ). Therefore
for any λj <
2
c
− c and λi sufficiently large we have Θi ≤ 0 and Θj > 0 and λiΘj < 1, which,
by the definition of Ri, together imply Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj.
3. If Ri · Rj < 1, then, by the definition of Ri and Rj, Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and λjΘi · λiΘj < 1.
By the unique best-response function derived in Eq. (10), equilibrium messages in this
class of games satisfy s∗i =
λj
Θi sj and s
∗
j = λiΘj si. Given that
λj
Θi · λiΘj < 1, these equations are
jointly satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0, which is therefore the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium pair of messages. This implies that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
is ((0, xe1 (s1, s2)) , (0, xe2 (s1, s2))) (where (xe1 (s1, s2) , xe2 (s1, s2)) is the unique equilibrium
in the second round following a message profile of (s1, s2) as defined in Section 2.2). As
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observed above (Fact 2), a unique subgame perfect equilibrium must also satisfy trembling-
hand perfection.
Finally, we prove that there always exists a pair (λi, λj) for which Ri · Rj < 1. By the
definition of Ri, any pair of parameters such that λi = λj > 0 implies Ri = Rj. If Ri = Rj
and it is not the case that min(Ri, Rj) > 1, we must have Ri · Rj < 1. The results from
point 1 of the theorem therefore imply that for all c > 1 there exists a λ /∈ [λc,λ+c ] such
that λi = λj = λ⇐⇒ Ri ·Rj < 1.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When λj = 0, the utility of player j is independent of sj. To see this, we impose the
condition λj = 0, on the expression for utility, taking subgame play as given (the analogue of
Eq. (7) for player j). This yields
Uj(sj, si, c) =
c(λisi)2
2[c(c+ λi)− 1]2 (37)
This expression is clearly independent of sj and therefore any message sent by player j is a
best response to any si. The utility of player i as a function of si, taking subgame play as given,
is
Ui(si, sj, c) =
c(1− c22 )(λisi)2
[c(c+ λi)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − cλisi
c(c+ λi)− 1
]2
(38)
The first derivative of this function with respect to si is given by:[
2− c2 − 1
c(c+ λi)
]
si (39)
Observe that Eq. (39) is negative iff λi < 1c(2−c2) − c, and in this case: (I) Θi = −
[
2− c2 −
1
c(c+λi)
]
> 0, (II) the utility function is everywhere decreasing in si, and (III) the optimal choice
of si, given any sj, is 0. This implies that in this case there is a unique continuum of subgame
perfect equilibria in which si = 0 and sj can take any value in [0, 1].
When Eq. (39) is positive, then: (I) Θi = −
[
2−c2− 1
c(c+λi)
]
< 0 and, by definition, Ri =∞,
(II) the utility function is everywhere increasing in si, and (III) the optimal choice of si, given
any sj, is 1. This implies that in this case there is a unique continuum of subgame perfect
equilibria in which si = 1 and sj can take any value in [0, 1].
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Finally, when λi = 1c(2−c2) − c, Eq. (39) is zero and any message si ∈ [0, 1] is optimal. This
implies that for any (si, sj) ∈ S × S, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the
messages are (si, sj).
The argument that these equilibria satisfy trembling-hand perfection is analogous to the
arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 1, and is omitted for brevity.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Corollary 1 shows that if players have identical positive reneging costs in the partnership
game, then they play identical messages in its unique perfect equilibrium, and therefore the game
admits either a no-effort or a maximum message equilibrium. If λi = λj = 0, Eq. (6) implies
that xi = xj = 0 and the game admits only a no-effort equilibrium. Therefore, a symmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the population game corresponds to either a no-effort or a
maximum message equilibrium of the partnership game. We consider these two sets of symmetric
strategy profiles in turn.
For any λ such that the unique equilibrium in the corresponding partnership game G(λ, λ)
is a no-effort equilibrium, we have pi (λ, λ) = 0. Lemma 4 shows that for all λ ≥ 0, there exists
a λ′ ≥ 0 such that pi
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> 0. Therefore, for all λ such that pi (λ, λ) = 0, (λ, λ) cannot be a
Nash equilibrium of the population game.
For any λ such that the unique equilibrium in the corresponding partnership game, G(λ, λ),
is a maximum message equilibrium, we say that such an equilibrium is either interior to the
set of maximum message equilibria or exterior to that set. An equilibrium is interior if there
exists a δ¯ such that for all 0 < δ < δ¯, the unique equilibrium of G(λ + δ, λ) is a maximum
message equilibrium, and it is exterior otherwise. For all λ such that the unique equilibrium of
G(λ, λ) is a maximum message equilibrium, the equilibrium payoff to both players is obtained
by substituting si = sj = 1 in Eq. (7):
pii(λi, λj) =
[(c+ λj)λi + λj][(c+ λi)λj + λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λj)λi + λj]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 (40)
The first derivative of this function with respect to λi is
(c− 1)(1 + c+ λj)[λic3 + 2c2λiλj + cλi(λ2j − λj − 2)− λj(1 + λi(2 + λj))]
[c2 − 1 + λiλj + c(λi + λj)]3 (41)
14
Imposing the condition λi = λj = λ, we can simplify this expression to11
(c− 1)[c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ]λ
[c+ 1 + λ][c− 1 + λ]3 (42)
This expression is strictly positive if and only if
c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ > 0 ⇐⇒ λ < 1 + c− c
2
c− 1 (43)
Recall from Theorem 1 that a maximum message equilibrium exists only if min(Ri, Rj) > 1
and that this requires that either Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi > 1 (and that the analogous conditions hold for
j) and hence the conditions in either Lemma 1 or Lemma 2 must hold. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
each imply that
λj <
2− c2
c− 1 (44)
Therefore when λi = λj = λ, we have
λ <
2− c2
c− 1 <
1 + c− c2
c− 1 (45)
Where the second inequality clearly follows when c > 1. We can see that this yields us the
second inequality in Eq. (43) and hence Eq. (42) is always positive in a maximum message
equilibrium.
Therefore, for any strategy profile of the population game (λ, λ) such that G(λ, λ) admits an
interior maximum message equilibrium, there exists some λ′ > λ such that pi
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> pi(λ, λ)
and hence no such strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the population game.
We have shown that the only potential symmetric pure Nash equilibria of the population game
are those corresponding to symmetric exterior maximum message equilibria of the partnership
game. Lemma 5 shows that there is a unique game G(λ+c , λ+c ) that admits such an equilibrium
when c ∈ (1, 1.24). We now show that (λ+c , λ+c ) is a Nash equilibrium of the population game.
We first show that any unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to a lower reneging
aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ) for λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ) . Point (2) of
Lemma 5 says that for all λ′ ∈ [0, λ+c ), the game G
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
does not admit a maximum message
equilibrium. Therefore for all such deviations, the unique equilibrium of the corresponding
partnership game G
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
is either a no-effort or a two-message equilibrium. In the former
case, the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have pi (λ+c , λ+c ) > pi(λ
′
, λ+c ) = 0. In the
case of a two-message equilibrium, the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by substituting
11The derivative given by Eq. (41) and its simplification when λi = λj is obtained using Mathematica. Code
available in the supplementary appendix accompanying this paper.
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the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 6) into the expression for material payoff (Eq. 1) and
imposing the conditions si = λjΘi and sj = 1 and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the player making
the deviation):
pii(λi, λ+c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi
λj
Θi + λ
+
c ][(c+ λi)λ+c + λi
λj
Θi ]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
− c[(c+ λ
+
c )λi
λj
Θi + λ
+
c ]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
(46)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λi is12
[λ+c ]2(c(λ+c + c)− 1)2
[1 + (c+ λ+c )(c+ λi)(c(λ+c + c)− 2)]3
(47)
Clearly the numerator of Eq. (47) is always positive. A sufficient condition for the denominator,
and hence for the whole expression, to be strictly positive is that
c(λ+c + c)− 2 > 0 ⇐⇒ λ+c >
2
c
− c (48)
This always holds as
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
2
c
− c
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c2 +√5− 4c > 4(c− 1)
c
− 2c(c− 1)
⇐⇒ − 3 +√5− 4c+ 4
c
> 0
⇐⇒ c < 1.25
Where the final ⇐⇒ follows from the fact that √5− 4c is positive and defined if and only if
c < 1.25, and 4
c
− 3 is positive for all c < 1.33.
To complete the proof, we show that a unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to
a higher reneging aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< pi(λ+c , λ+c ) for λ
′
> λ+c
. By the definition of an exterior equilibrium, the unique equilibrium of all the corresponding
partnership games G
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
is either a no-effort or a two-message equilibrium. In the former
case, the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have pi (λ+c , λ+c ) > pi(λ
′
, λ+c ) = 0. In the
case of a two-message equilibrium, the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by substituting
the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 6) into the expression for material payoff (Eq. 1) and
imposing the conditions si = 1 and sj = λiΘj and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the player making
12This derivative was calculated using Mathematica. Code is available in the supplementary appendix of this
paper.
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the deviation):
pii(λi, λ+c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ+c λiΘj ][(c+ λi)λ
+
c
λi
Θj + λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
−
c[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ+c λiΘj ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ+c )− 1]2
(49)
In the supplementary appendix of this paper, we present the explicit formula for derivative
of Eq. (49) with respect to λi and the Mathematica code proving that this derivative is strictly
negative for all λi > λ+c . Hence for any λi > λ+c such that the unique equilibrium of G(λi, λ+c )
is a two-message equilibrium we have pi (λi, λ+c ) < pi(λ+c , λ+c ). Therefore, the population game
admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, (λ+c , λ+c ).
We saw that any possible deviation from this equilibrium yields the deviating player a strictly
lower payoff and hence this equilibrium is strict (point 1). By definition, λ+c is the highest
reneging cost, given c, such that the unique equilibrium of G(λ+c , λ+c ) is a maximum message
equilibrium and therefore si = sj = 1 in the equilibrium of this game (point 2).
To see point 3 (i.e., pi (λ+c , λ+c ) > pi
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c ), we recall again by Corollary
1 that the unique equilibrium of any G(λ, λ), is symmetric and therefore either a no-effort
equilibrium or a maximum message equilibrium. For any λ such that the unique equilibrium of
G(λ, λ) is a no-effort equilibrium, si = sj = xi = xj = 0 and so pi(λ, λ) = 0. To find the material
payoff in a maximum message equilibrium, we recall Eq. (1) for the material payoff, and impose
xi = xj = x, which yields
pi(λ, λ) = x2 − cx
2
2 (50)
Which is clearly positive and increasing in x for all c < 2. The reneging cost that maximises
the material payoff in a symmetric game is therefore that which maximises equilibrium effort.
Equilibrium effort in a maximum message equilibrium is obtained by imposing si = sj = 1 and
λi = λj = λ on the equation for equilibrium effort (Eq. 6):
(c+ λ)λ+ λ
(c+ λ)(c+ λ)− 1 =
λ
c+ λ− 1 (51)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λ is
(c+ λ− 1)− λ
[c+ λ− 1]2 =
(c− 1)
[c+ λ− 1]2 (52)
Which is clearly positive for all c > 1. Therefore, the reneging cost that maximises effort,
and therefore the material payoff, in a symmetric game is the highest λ such that the unique
equilibrium of G(λ, λ) is a maximum message equilibrium. By definition, this is λ+c .
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To see point 4 (i.e., λ+c and pi (λ+c , λ+c ) are decreasing in c), we recall that:
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) =
1 + 2c(1− c) +√5− 4c
2(c− 1) (53)
We can see that for c ∈ (1, 1.25), the numerator of Eq. (53) is decreasing in c. The denom-
inator of Eq. (53) is increasing in c and hence λ+c is decreasing in c for all c ∈ (1, 1.22). Given
that we showed that for λ such that G(λ, λ), pi(λ, λ) is increasing in λ and that λ+c is decreasing
in c, we have that pi(λ+c , λ+c ) is decreasing in c.
To see point 5 (i.e., limc→1 λ+c =∞, and limc→1 pi (λ+c , λ+c ) = 12), we note that as c→ 1, the
numerator of Eq. (53) is increasing and the denominator of Eq. (53) converges to zero. Hence
limc→1 λ+c =∞. To find the limit of the players’ material payoff in the game G(λ+c , λ+c ) as c→ 1,
we substitute the expression for effort in a maximum message equilibrium (Eq. 51) into that for
material payoff in a symmetric equilibrium (Eq. (50)) when λ = λ+c :
pi(λ+c , λ+c ) = [
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
]2[1− c2] (54)
As c→ 1, λ+c →∞ and therefore the limit of Eq. (54) is given by
lim
c→1pi(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = limc→1[
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
]2[1− c2] = (1−
1
2) =
1
2 (55)
D.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We have to prove that for each c ∈ (1, 1.22), there exists q¯ < 1 such that (λ+c , λ+c ) is a
strict Nash equilibrium of the population game with observability q for each q ∈ [q¯, 1), i.e., that
piq (λ′, λ+c |λ+c ) < pi (λ+c , λ+c ) for all λ′ 6= λ+c . We first note that by Lemma 5, for any λ′ 6= λ+c , the
partnership game played after reneging costs are observed, G(λ′, λ+c ), does not admit a maximum
message equilibrium and so, by Theorem 1, must admit either a no-effort (si = sj = 0) or a
two-message (si 6= sj) equilibrium. In the no-effort case, the material payoff to both players
is zero and hence any mutant λ′ such that G(λ′, λ+c ) induces a no-effort equilibrium achieves a
strictly lower material payoff than the incumbent type λ+c in encounters where reneging costs
are observed. In the proof of Theorem 2 it was shown that when λ′ ≤ λ+c the derivative is equal
to (the left derivative when λ′ = λ+c ):
∂pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∂λ′
= [λ
+
c ]2(c(λ+c + c)− 1)2
[1 + (c+ λ+c )(c+ λ
′)(c(λ+c + c)− 2)]3
(56)
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and that this expression is always strictly positive for c ∈ (1, 1.25). In particular, this implies
that
lim
λ′↗λ+c
∂pi
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∂λ′
> 0 (57)
The fact that the derivative of the material payoff function with respect to λ′ is strictly
positive for all λ′ < λ+c and that the left derivative at λ+c is bounded away from zero implies
that when reneging costs are observed and a two-message equilibrium is induced, there is a first
order material payoff loss for a mutant with λ′ < λ+c , compared to the incumbent type λ+c . Now,
considering the case where λ′ > λ+c when G(λ′, λ+c ) induces a two-message equilibrium, we note
that, analogously, in the proof of Theorem 2 it was shown that when λ′ ≥ λ+c , the derivative
of the payoff function with respect to λ′ is strictly negative and that the right derivative of the
payoff function, evaluated at λ+c , is strictly negative, i.e., the payoff increases as λ
′ decreases
towards λ+c (Mathematica code demonstrating this is in the online appendix). Therefore there
is also a first-order loss for a mutant with λ′ > λ+c when reneging costs are observed. We have
therefore demonstrated that any mutant achieves a strictly lower payoff in the partnership games
played after reneging costs are observed than does an incumbent, i.e., pi (λ′, λ+c ) < pi (λ+c , λ+c ) for
all λ′ 6= λ+c , and, further, that the first-order loss of a mutant is bounded away from zero when
λ
′ → λ+c .
Next, we note that in the case where reneging costs are not observed, piq (λ′, λ+c |λ+c ) −
piq (λ+c , λ+c ) is bounded from above by a uniform bound. To see this, note that the maximum
material payoff achievable in a partnership game is
1
c
− c(
1
c
)2
2 =
1
2c
The payoff differential between a mutant of type λ′, relative to the incumbents of type λ+c
when reneging costs are observed, can therefore be given by q· [pi (λ′, λ+c ) − pi (λ+c , λ+c )] . The
maximum positive payoff differential between a mutant of type λ′, relative to λ+c when reneging
costs are not observed, is (1 − q) · 12c . Therefore, the maximum payoff differential between a
mutant type and an incumbent type under partial observability is:
q· [pi
(
λ′, λ+c
)
− pi
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
] + (1− q) 12c (58)
We therefore have that a mutant of type λ′ is strictly outperformed by the incumbent type when
Eq. (58) is strictly negative. Imposing this strict negativity and rearranging for q yields:
q >
1
1 + 2c[pi (λ+c , λ+c )− pi (λ′, λ+c )]
≡ q˜λ′ (59)
From the fact that the term in square brackets in the denominator of Eq. (59) is strictly
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positive, it is immediate that q˜λ′ ∈ (0, 1). We then define q¯ ≡ sup {q˜λ′ : λ′ ∈ R+}. It follows
that for all c ∈ (1, 1.22), there exists a q¯ such that for all q ∈ [q¯, 1], (λ+c , λ+c ) is a strict Nash
equilibrium of the population game with partial observability.
The stable population in the setting with partial observability has been proven to be identical
to the population in the setting with perfect observability. Therefore, results (2) to (5) of
Theorem 2 pertaining to the equilibrium play and the payoffs of this stable population, hold
also in the partial observability setting.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If the incumbents have λ = 0, then they exert no effort due to Fact 1. If the incumbents
have λ > 0, then, assume to the contrary that agents exert a positive level of effort on the
equilibrium path. By Theorem 1, this implies that all agents send the maximum message 1
and, due to the payoff function being strictly convex, that they exert the same positive level of
effort xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c) > 0 on the equilibrium path in the second stage (see Eq. 6). Consider a
mutant with zero reneging cost who sends message 1 and then exerts effort 1
c
·xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c). It
is immediate that such a mutant achieves strictly higher fitness than the incumbents because
the mutant exerts the unique amount of effort that maximises the fitness, given that the partner
exerts effort xei (1, 1, λ, λ, c).
D.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We show that there can be no symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of the population game
in which players exert no effort on the equilibrium path. Consider any symmetric population
in which players have a level of reneging aversion λ and in which, in game G(λ, λ), the unique
equilibrium is a no-effort equilibrium and hence all players achieve a material payoff of zero, i.e.,
pi(λ, λ) = 0. Lemma 4 implies that for any such λ, there exists λ′ such that in G(λ, λ′) – the
partnership game played where players of type λ and type λ′ meet and observe their opponent’s
level of reneging aversion - both players exert positive effort in equilibrium and achieve strictly
positive material payoffs. As any player can always guarantee a payoff of at least zero in any
interaction, a player of type λ′ achieves a weakly positive payoff from the partnership game
played after players of types λ and λ′ meet but do not observe their opponent’s level of reneging
aversion. Therefore, when q > 0 (players in a population observe each other’s level of reneging
aversion at least some of the time) any mutant of the type λ′ achieves a strictly positive fitness
in the population game with partial observability, i.e., piq
(
λ
′
, λ|λ
)
> 0 = pi(λ, λ).
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